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Abstract 
Energy consumption is one of the priorities of security on the Internet of Things. It is not easy 
to find the best solutions that will reduce energy consumption, while ensuring that the security 
requirements are met. Many of the issues that have been presented so far have covered the 
basics of security, such as the basic principles of encryption, extension environments, target 
applications, and so on.  
This paper examines one of the most effective energy-efficiency mechanisms for providing 
Internet-based security services. By studying techniques that enable the development of 
advanced energy-efficient security solutions, we take a closer look at the ideas that have already 
been introduced in this area. In this study, not only the security issues, but also the energy 
impacts on solutions have been considered. Initially, the amount of energy related to security 
services is introduced. Then a classification is proposed for energy efficient mechanisms on 
the Internet of Things. Finally, the main drivers of the impact of energy saving techniques are 
analyzed for security solutions. 
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The Internet of Things (IoT) is a relatively new idea that attracted the attention of all the 
scientific and industrial communities. It involves network expansion in the true sense of the 
word, including the connection of physical things. With respect to communication 
technologies, the things (such as sensors, stimulators, RFID tags) can communicate with each 
other as well as with users to achieve common goals. Although the potential of the Internet-
produced things helps many different applications in different areas (such as intelligent cities, 
smart grids, health care, etc.), the deployment of this technology on a large scale also depends 
on power and security [1, 2]. 
Many Internet applications are the things that are very sensitive. For example, the parameters 
measured by sensors in a health care program measure the physiological signs of a human 
being, such as heart rate or body temperature. This sensitive information should not be made 
available to unauthorized persons. On the other hand, the Internet of Things for many types of 
attacks is vulnerable. The ability to listen (eavesdropper), modify or interfere with information 
in networks that typically use wireless communications without proper infrastructure is easier 
than wire-based networks. The things can also be compromised, and malicious nodes may enter 
the network, which may lead to unauthorized actions on data and network resources. In 
addition, the Internet of Things can be a major breach of privacy for users. Therefore, it is 
important to consider the security services needed to ensure the protection of the Internet of 
Things from attacks. 
Security services are usually based on heavy-duty programs (e.g., encryption / decryption and 
signature / authentication). They generally need to consume a lot of resources to maintain a 
high level of security. However, the Internet of Things includes devices that are limited in terms 
of resources (e.g., energy, storage, and communications). The use of heavy security initiatives 
in some nodes, as RFID sensors or tags, requires a lot of energy resources, which can distract 
nodes from performing their core tasks. Since nodes are powered by batteries and are expected 
to continue to operate on the same battery for a long time, the optimal energy consumption of 
this type of network is essential and vital. When the things need to operate independently 
without human intervention, battery replacement may even be impossible in many cases. 
Therefore, security solutions should work with regard to the energy constraints of the nodes or 
with a long-term view of them. 
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With the advent of Low-power and Lossy Networks (LLNs), several studies have been 
conducted on energy-saving solutions for security services. These studies are diverse and 
include a variety of aspects, such as security initiatives, development environments, targeted 
applications, and so on. Therefore, finding an efficient method is important and requires careful 
study that reduces energy consumption while providing a degree of security assurance. The 
goal is to evaluate the efficient energy mechanisms that can be used in Internet security things. 
This research is designed to help design security protocols and to choose the right mechanism 
for energy saving. With this aim in mind, this paper proposes the categorization of energy-
efficient mechanisms in the Internet of Things, examining each of the major mechanisms and 
analyzing its application. The benefits of this review are helping to use energy efficient 
mechanisms for Internet security solutions. While other studies on the security of the Internet 
of Things have focused more on energy efficiency protocols, we go beyond this and we propose 
an energy-efficient solution based on energy efficiency. 
The contents of this review can be summarized in three principles: 
 Discussion of the security services on the Internet of Things from the point of view of 
energy consumption 
 An energy efficient energy efficiency classification is suggested in the Internet Security 
of the Things. Each of them, along with some of the suggested solutions that use these 
mechanisms, is being studied. 
 Discussion on the environment and application of energy saving mechanism in the 
Internet security services of the things. 
The remainder of this article is as follows: In Section 2, studies on the security of the Internet 
of Things are presented and the motivation for doing so. Part Three deals with services that can 
be taken into consideration to ensure the security of the Internet. It will also point to the amount 
of energy related to security services. Energy saving mechanisms in security will be studied in 
the fourth section. This section provides a classification of existing mechanisms and examines 
the solutions that use these techniques. In the fifth section, we will look at the appropriate 
environment and the use of energy saving mechanisms for Internet security solutions. Finally, 
Section Six concludes with this article. 
2. RELATED WORKS 
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Several studies on the security of the Internet of Things have led to the emergence of security 
issues on the Internet of Things. Most of these studies examine existing security protocols and 
their solutions. For example, Autoseri and colleagues [1] conduct a general study of the Internet 
of Things, and they study some privacy restrictions and privacy solutions, as well as issues that 
may be addressed. Mirundi and his colleagues examined the same observations [2]. 
Other surveys deal with a specific security service on the Internet. Roman et al. [3] have 
evaluated key management systems for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) in the Internet of 
Things. These reviews include public key cryptography, pre-shared key and key management 
systems associated with the link layer. Yan and his colleagues [4] offer a survey on trust 
management for the Internet of Things.  
The authors identify the goals of trust management systems and evaluate existing Internet 
solutions for the things. Nguyen and colleagues focus on bootstrapping on the Internet of 
Things. They provide a classification of the existing security protocols for a secure Bootstrap 
process on WSNs and the Internet of Things. They also discuss their use and limitations. 
Other studies on the security of the Internet of Things have led to the proposal and deployment 
of a new architecture. The authors focus on the security and privacy of Internet distributed 
objects. They carry out the features of the distributed method and analyze the attacker's models 
and examine the existing security solutions. Greenal et al., [7] pointed out in another study how 
to create a secure way when connecting things to the Internet. This paper will highlight the 
low-level integration of WSN strategies with the Internet and the security it needs, looking at 




[1 and 2] 
Open Public Issues in Internet 
Security Things 
[3] 
KMS for WSNs on the Internet of 
Things 
[4] 
Trust Management Solutions and 
Challenges 
[5] 
A solution for a secure bootstrap 
process 
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Security issues and privacy on the 
Internet are distributed objects 
[7] 
WSN security solutions integrated 
with the Internet 
[8] 
Security standards for Internet 
communications objects 
[9] 
Security, privacy, trust needs and 
solutions 
[10] 
Security rules and privacy 
challenges 
 
Table 1: Research on Internet Security of Things 
The expansion and deployment of the Internet of Things is dependent on the development of 
new communications protocols and standards. Granoll et al. [8] refer to the security standards 
for Internet communications of Things. They consider a stack of standard communication 
protocols designed for the Internet of Things. Then, they consider security issues and discuss 
the stack for each communication protocol. 
The security offers provided relate to middleware-based projects and solutions. Sikari [9] has 
conducted a survey on the Internet of Things. They analyze existing solutions in terms of 
security, trust and privacy, as well as the exclusion of projects and middleware that deal with 
these issues. 
Issues of security and privacy on the Internet of Things can also be legally discussed. Weber 
[10] refers to the Internet security of things. He offers security and privacy requirements and 
discusses strengths to create a proper legal framework by an international legislator. 
This review of the studies mentioned above is different in comparison with the Internet security 
of things. In fact, many of the solutions provided to provide network security point to energy 
as a key factor in the security of the Internet of objects, since it is expected that things with 
limited resources are independent for a period of time Work a long time. On the other hand, 
there have been numerous works on energy security issues in the field of security. The 
aforementioned research further explores the solutions that are appropriate for the Internet of 
Things (summarized in Table 1); mainly refers to energy efficiency goals. The purpose of this 
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study is to explore techniques that enable the development of energy-based security solutions. 
This provides an instructional approach and helps design a security protocol to optimize 
efficient solutions. Such a view has not been used in previous studies. 
To achieve the goals set out in the research, we begin by providing some of the security services 
on the Internet of things, as we will point to the efficient and efficient use of energy. 
3. SECURITY SERVICES ON THE INTERNET 
Security can be guaranteed by using certain services to protect against attacks. In fact, security 
services are based on the steps needed to deal with threats. In Section 1, we will examine some 
of the security services that can be used on the Internet of Things. This section also relates to 
security related resources. 
3-1 Confidentiality 
Information privacy is a security service that ensures that the contents of a specific message 
are not accessible to an unauthorized person. This is done by encrypting messages using 
symmetric or asymmetric encryption, so it can only be decoded by the authorized person. 
With low power consumption (limited nodes), symmetric cryptographic schemes are widely 
used in limited networks such as WSNs. Many evaluations, for example [11, 12], show that 
symmetric ciphers (such as AES, RC5 [13, 14] or Skipjack [15]) are suitable for finite things. 
However, key management in symmetric encryption creates problems when a large-scale 
network is found. 
In the Internet of Things, the problem of scalability is more intense. In fact, since 2006, writers 
such as Lopez [16] further reveal the limitation of the use of symmetric encryption for WSN. 
On the other hand, asymmetric cryptography provides efficient key management, but it 
increases the consumption of more energy than symmetric cryptography. Protocols such as 
RSA [14] or IBE [17], which are widely used on the Internet, are very sensitive to 
computations. In terms of processing and consuming resources, the use of these protocols for 




3-2 Authentication and access control 
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Authentication is a security service that is used to ensure that people who claim to be (corporate 
authentication) or received messages are the same as the original message (message 
confirmation). As used to control access or to allow or prohibit access to resources by a person, 
according to the organization's policy. Access control is generally performed after the 
verification of institutions / data. 
Because of the low cost of computing, some access control and verification solutions are used 
in networks that are limited by symmetric encryption (including [18-20]). It is often used with 
mechanisms for distributing keys. However, it may also do these solutions only for applications 
designed for them and may not be supported on large-scale networks. Moreover, when using 
symmetric cryptography, it is difficult to ensure that the message is verified with the advantage 
of not denying it. Even though some solutions, such as SNEP and μTESLA [21], need to 
synchronize time and manage keystrokes by storing them by mimicking asymmetric encryption 
(through disclosure of latency keys and one-way key chain keys). This will cause traffic 
problems for large and large-scale networks. 
On the other hand, authentication and access control solutions based on asymmetric 
cryptography eliminate the need for more complex protocols and increased security. However, 
public key cryptography in a limited node is very difficult to process and consume, as 
previously mentioned. For example, feature-based encryption (ABE) and its related protocols 
are widely used to control access with scalable management. Considering these protocols for 
limited networks, for example, the Internet of Things, is related to the cost of consumption. 
3-3 Signature / confirmation 
Digital signing is a security service that adds an entity or identity to a piece of information. 
This ensures authentication, integrity and non-denial. One of the most important uses of digital 
signatures is public key certification. 
For digital signatures, public key cryptography is used more often. X.509 and ISO / IEC9796 
are based on public key cryptography. Examples of asymmetric encryption have been used in 
the RSA encryption [14] or the prototype [24]. However, these asymmetric protocols are very 
heavy in terms of calculation, and their direct use of objects for the Internet will be 
inappropriate. 
Although single-signature designs (many of which come from symmetric key encryption) 
require less computations, they need to be changed after each use. So that signatures cannot be 
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falsified [25]. It affects the storage and capacity of communications and traffic in networks and 




The basic operations used in 
asymmetric cryptography is 
usually heavy 
Data size 
The size of the data is 




The frequent use of a security 
service can have a huge impact on 
consumption 
Table 2: Analysis of energy consumption in security services 
3-4 Key deployment 
A key deployment or bootstrapping key is a process that allows the setting between two or 
more parties to be used to share encrypted keys. Essentially, a secure communication link 
between the nodes (before the network can work or when a re-entry is required) is necessary 
to be able to perform other security services. 
Pre-distribution designs are commonly known as symmetric key designs, which include 
quantitative calculations. They work on pre-installed credits (pre-deployment). Several pre-
distribute solutions are presented in this area, which are mainly used for WSN (such as [26-
30]). However, these programs can also be designed and executed for local networks, but the 
creation of keys with a remote entity cannot be solved. Many Internet objects of the things 
require the establishment of secure connections between nodes without the need for any prior 
knowledge of each other or shared sharing keys. 
In contrast, asymmetric key designs for the Internet are more focused and do not require basic 
knowledge. However, the two categories of asymmetric key designs, key transfers, and key 
agreements, include high-level computing and processing. Key transport protocols (such as 
loss) TLS [31] are based on public key cryptography, which is usually sensitive to resources. 
Key protocol protocols (such as Internet Key Keys (IKE), the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) 
[33]) also use many resources, because they essentially use asymmetric encryption. 
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Additionally, an authentication mechanism for asymmetric key designs may be needed to 
connect the partner key to establish a connection. Asymmetric key patterns for very limited 
resources such as the Internet of things cause very heavy pressure. 
3-5 Negotiation 
Several security services for the Internet are needed, many of which include heavy bumps. The 
issue of energy savings in LLNs should be solved somehow. For example, it offers several key 
solutions to create WSNs based on pre-distribution (less energy consumption, but not 
economical for large networks). However, the Internet faces new features, such as scalability. 
This makes some energy security solutions not suitable for Internet applications at the moment. 
The problem of energy use in security services is more intense in the Internet of Things. 
To understand the overhead reasons, an analysis is made on the use of security services in the 
context of the Internet of Things. The results of this analysis can be summarized in three levels: 
heavy operations, data size and number of calls. Table 2 provides a summary of the above 
analysis. 
Heavy operations 
The most important reason for high security costs is heavy processing operations. This 
processing is mainly done in asymmetric cryptography. In fact, asymmetric cryptography is 
based on the use of hard issues for security purposes, so it is impossible or very difficult to 
reconstruct private parameters from the public [25]. The mathematical operations used for these 
types of issues are issues such as exponential (power) and residual issues that are generally 
operational with heavy processing. 
The power (ge) and its residual (ge mod p) are the basis of many cryptographic protocols such 
as Delphi-Hellman (DH) [34] (which are the basis of many key negotiation protocols) or RSA. 
These operations are very computationally heavy, since the parameters used in it are 
numerically numerical for a number of reasons. Shrinking the parameters can reduce the 
overhead of the operations, but it is not always possible, as the risk of guessing the parameters 
increases. Watro et al., proposed adaptation of the RSA protocol with limited resources. Their 
idea is based on the use of smaller parameters such as less power. However, this is at the 
expense of the security level [36]. The evaluation by Watro et al. [35] on Mica1 shows that 
RSA deviation can reduce the runtime by more than 10 seconds using small indexes. 
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Other operations that are used in many cryptographic protocols are a two-way linear pairing. 
These are other applications to provide security concepts such as IBE [17] and its variants (the 
idea of which was given by Shamir in 1984) (or ABE [23] and its variants). However, these 
are extremely heavy-duty operations for limited nodes (the basic mathematical operations are 
heavily based on basic processing). Olivera et al. [38] and colleagues show that running pairing 
operations on the MicaZ node using the TinyPBC suggestions requires more than 5.5 seconds. 
Given the fact that cryptographic operations generally require pairing at least twice, it means 
that the security service can take up to 11 seconds. 
Data size 
A security service is used to ensure data is secure. The time taken to run the security service 
is proportional to the size of the data. When the data size is large, it will take longer to run. 
Energy consumption follows directly from this fact. 
The data size is not only about the data to be processed, but also the metadata of the security 
protocol data. In fact, security protocols that outline communication aspects, such as Internet 
Protocol Security (IPsec), Transport Layer Security (TLS) [40], or Datagram TLS (DTLS) 
[41]), a packet header have been considered. As it is sent and received by limited nodes, the 
size of this series also affects the amount of energy consumed. 
Number of calls 
Another issue that affects the amount of energy used by security services is the number of calls. 
This parameter depends on how the security service is used, as well as the number of times that 
you need to use this service. For example, consider a key deployment protocol that is relatively 
heavy (in seconds or seconds, respectively). A limited node can execute this protocol at one 
time at the same time. However, if this step is repeated several times (for example, because of 
a re-request), the energy implications can be critical. The frequent use of a security service has 
a great impact on consumption, compared with a small use of it. 
It seems that many of the security protocols needed on the Internet are heavy computing and 
computing. This raises the need for mechanisms that reduce energy consumption in security 
solutions. The next section examines energy-efficient energy security techniques. 
 
4. Energy saving techniques in security 
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In this section, we examine the main mechanisms available to save energy in security services. 
Solutions that use these techniques are also provided. The proposed classification of energy 




Online security / offline security (offline) 
The concept of online security / offline (offline) involves breaking down the encryption scheme 
in two steps. First, it is done offline (before the security service) (before knowing the 
destination, encryption message or signature, etc.) before the security service begins. This 
phase reduces part of cryptographic overlays by computing and storing the results of some of 
the operations that are required. The second step is done online. Using the stored results from 
the first phase, and its use in the second phase, the operations will be very quick [42, 43]. 
Therefore, online / offline security (offline) can reduce energy consumption by off-line 
transmission, before deployment (or when an available external power source is available), and 
only in the second stage Instead of the entire encryption scheme, it will do just that. 
An online / offline approach (offline) to change the security scheme in the encryption algorithm 
helps to create two steps. Heavier operations are transmitted to the offline stage (offline), so 
the energy consumption for the plan is reduced. Obviously, what is transmitted offline must be 
computed before the security service begins. It is difficult to use an online / offline approach 
because some heavy operations generally relate to data that may not be known in advance (e.g., 
encryption message, destination key, etc.). Based on the two-phase method for encryption, we 




















Compact size weak 
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The correct method for enforcing online / offline security is performed by transferring all 
advanced operations that need to be pre-calculated to offline. This will reduce the consumption 
associated with it, in the online phase. Operational-focused solutions are placed on the surface 
of the encryption operations and offer a way to calculate these operations. 
Some security plans can naturally be divided into online and offline stages. Pleasure and his 
colleagues in [44] propose schemes that optimize the power consumption of cryptographic 
operations in wireless sensor networks (EH-WSN).  
 
 Balanced assistant Focused on threats 
Service focused Half-balanced assistant Data-centered 
 An unreliable assistant  
 
The sequence of passwords is usually executed using the XOR operator between simple text 
bytes and key sequence bytes. These are produced randomly from the series. The proposal is 
based on preprocessing of bytes and the key sequence buffer during periods of high energy, 
and they can be used in subsequent procedures. The results of the evaluation using the code 
sequence Trivium ATmega128L and MSP430 indicate that energy consumption can be reduced 
by 14%. 
In [43, 45], Schnorr is offering nonlinear sign-on / off-line signing plans for smart cards. Its 
purpose is to reduce the cost of the calculator for the signer and to obtain consistent 
equivalence-based (fixed-base) matching algorithms, which are examples of Brickell-
McCurley [46] or El-Gamal [24]. This is done by preprocessing and saving a set of x i = a r i 
mod p and r i are randomly selected. For each signature, the conjugate is calculated as the 
multiplication of x i. However, Flight in [47, 48] shows that the plan is vulnerable to attacks 
that run on secret key recovery (private key). In fact, the combination of power does not 
guarantee randomness, and dependency may be created, leading to a successful attack chance. 
Since then, other solutions have been proposed to predict synchronic calculations. For example, 
the suggestion in [49] introduces a method for dividing the power to a product of a given 
number of cases with more crashes. A suggestion inspired in [50] by its idea. This is a surplus 
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chain technique for calculating product yields. This method is a bit slower than the method 
described in [49], but requires much less memory. 
Geo et al. [51, 157] (and other works such as [52-55]) in designing an on line / off-line project 
(for offline) for a variety of IBE-based encryption such as Boneh-Boyen IBE [56, 158] or 
goutricus IBE [57] are using this method. In such protocols, neither the message nor the identity 
of the recipient at the offline stage is known. This idea is based on the addition of a correction 
factor. In fact, in the Boneh-Boyen IBE encryption text, the section containing the destination 
attribute takes the form below. 
 
And a message m for encryption takes the form below. 
e ( g 1 , g 2 ) 
s . m  
(e represents a two-way or two-way map, while g1, h, and g2 are elements of a cyclic group of 
first order blows, see [56] for details). For the second part, e (g1, g2)
s can be performed off-line 
and only one line multiplication (online) is required. However, in the first part, the identifier is 
in powers, which are the operations that have high energy consumption. The solution is 
modified according to the following model. In the offline, C1 and C2 form are calculated 
. 
Note that α and β are random numbers). The node in the online C3 (offline) is calculated as C 
3 = β-1 (ID –α( and adds it to the encryption text. This method requires a multiplication and a 
subtraction. Decoding can be obtained by calculating C0 as C  This may be due to the 
presence of an algebraic relationship between different identities. Note that these methods 
generally use key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM2) to speed up the on-line online process. 
In [58], Hopper and Waters suggest on-line and off-line schemes (on-line / offline) for feature-
specific encoding (ABE). Offline as defined in IBE, neither messages nor attributes in 
encryption are used. The authors talk about a large structure [59], which provides an algebraic 
relationship between traits (a correction solution similar to that already provided for IBE). 
Additionally, authors propose the key generation phase, online / offline optimization. The bulk 
of the key-production work can be done by offline servers and then transmitted to online 
servers, while incoming requests can be processed quickly. (A similar correction solution is 
used to generate keys). The evaluation of the performance suggests that more than 99% of 
computational work can be transmitted to off-line (offline) in many scenes. 
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The second-class line-of-security / offline is called service-oriented. Unlike the first, service-
centric approaches provide methods for constructing two phases without going to the level of 
cryptographic operations. Online / offline line-based services-based services do not require 
advanced knowledge of the encryption operations protocol to build processes. Some of the 
related solutions are listed below. 
In [42], Eyon et al., offer a way to build online / offline sign-offs. The solution is one-time 
signatures that are computationally very fast. The offline phase involves generating the pair of 
confirmation / confirmation keys at once and signing them using the signature signing scheme 
(energy efficiency optimization). Online, the node retrieves unused pairs of one-time keys and 
then signs the message using a signed signature once (fast-acting) signature. Confirmation is 
performed by checking the first key once according to the original signature designs (to confirm 
that it has been signed by the sender), and then this key can be used to confirm the message. 
However, as described in other works, this method increases the size of each of the signatures 
by a quadratic factor, which is the main problem (note that the confirmation of the key once 
and its signature both Signed messages are attached to enable verification.) 
In [60], Shamir and Theon consider another online / offline signature scheme (online / offline) 
based on secret hysterics functions [61]. An interlocking Hash function, h, is a potential 
function connected to two keys (a public key HK and a private TK). More precisely, given a 
message such as m and an auxiliary like r, it is difficult to find m, r so that h (m, r) = h (m ', r') 
is only known by HK. Let's deal with knowing the two keys. However, when TK is also known, 
it's easy to find them. In the off-line (offline), the node randomly generates m ', r', and the hash 
(Hash) uses HK to calculate them. The result is then signed using the essential signature plan. 
When the message for the signature, m, in the online phase is known, uses the node of its TK 
to find r such that h (m, r) = h (m ', r'). To confirm the need to calculate h (m, r) before validating 
it using the signature scheme is essential. Compared to Yewon's and his colleagues' 
suggestions, only r should be added to the signature to be verified. 
In [62], Bainchi et al., have proposed an on-line / off-line project, which supports the CP-ABE 
protocol [63] in the EH-WSN. The problem with using such a design for ABE relies on the fact 
that if the message is not known in the offline phase, its features will not be determined (access 
policy). Their proposed solution uses KEM (using offline CP-ABE encryption and encryption 
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codes online using session keys) and based on knowledge of access control policies that can be 
implemented over the length of time Program modes to be considered. When there is an energy 
surplus, the session keys are generated and encrypted using access control policies, which is 
most likely to capture the situation and this method is useful. The Markov model is based on 
choosing the best strategy to store and minimize potential cache. However, this technique can 
only be used for this matter, because information about destination and access is not always 
available. The difference between online / offline approaches (online / offline) (operations-
oriented and service-oriented) has created a two-step solution. Online and offline solutions 
identify heavy protocol processing operations and suggest that they provide a mechanism to 
predict their computation. In contrast, service-focused solutions provide a way to build two 
phases without reducing heavy activity. This will make the client solutions more general than 
the centralized activity. Even the proposal in [62], which raises the CP-ABE protocol, can be 
considered for other protocols. 
A summary of security solutions 
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Table 3: Online / offline security-based approaches 
4.2 Security outsourcing 
The outsourcing approach is based on the use of cryptographic support for high cost computing 
operations. This includes dividing the encryption algorithm into two parts. The first case runs 
locally, which has less computational compression. The second item is computed by 
cryptographic helpers and can perform computational calculations. Outsourcing solutions can 
reduce energy consumption by providing some operating costs to more powerful devices. 
Outsourced security is stronger for assistants based on heavy operations. However, the 
interference of other entities in a job such as security may be crucial and strategic. For example, 
consider the CP-ABE protocol [63]. Part of the encryption operations is performed by 
multiplying the plain text M with exponent e (g, g) αs. A simple way to apply outsourcing is to 
calculate e (g, g) αs in the node. However, knowing this flexibility will help the node retrieve 
plain text, even if it does not (split with power) into the node. Additionally, if the nodes return 
the wrong result, this can lead to a misleading security operations. 
Depending on the type of donation nodes and what should be given, we suggest that we 
consider categorizing outsourcing approaches into three types: remote security using Trust 
Assistants, use of Half Trust Assistants and the use of Unreliable Assistants. 
 
4.2.1 Trust Assistants 
Browser security can rely on trust helpers (trust assistants). Both sides fully trust me and there 
will be no security risks. Therefore, heavy operations can be transferred to that assistant without 
compromising security. Some outsourced security approaches are based on the trust assistants 
in the following cases. 
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In [36, 64], Ho and his colleagues provide a security service based on the RSA and XTEA 
protocol [65] for WSNs, using the help of a Trust Platform (TPM). TPM is a processor assistant 
that is intended to be added. It is a dedicated security chip designed to support cryptographic 
operations such as key generation, message signing and message encryption using a secure 
hash algorithm and random generators [66].  
Katmaier et al. [67, 68] suggest a method for creating and activating a key in DTLS using TPM 
assistance. TPM-equipped nodes can achieve full-fledged access to secure communications. 
Other nodes that are not equipped with TPM share DTLS types with shared keys. 
Other solutions for providing similar help as TPMs are provided by using other types of 
hardware. In [69], Barbareschi and colleagues have provided an implementation to support 
RSA / AES based security services on WSNs using the FPGA (Xilixn Zynq 70 0 FPGA / SoC 
family). Josef et al., [70] provided an outsourcing approach to implement IBE in a WSN. Their 
solution relies on the use of the ARM processor (ARM1176JZF-S) instead of the TPM chip. 
Trust outsourcing solutions are mainly based on hardware devices that can be added to the 
resource-limited node. This can help us to become more confident about security. However, 
this can be very expensive because the need to equip each resource-limited node with a 
dedicated assistant. 
4.2.2 Half Trust Assistants 
When a dedicated hardware such as TPM is not available as a trust assistant, a node may access 
unrestricted devices to perform external encryption operations externally. However, when it 
does, it is very important to ensure that the information that the donor does not deliver is not 
securely disclosed to others. This requires confidentiality to be respected when outsourcing is 
secure. The term "half-trust" refers to an entity that correctly performs what is requested, but 
can also provide more certainty about the reliability of the information. Here are some of the 
solutions that help assistants or half-trust assistants when outsourcing security: 
Thaati et al., [71.72] provide an outsourcing approach that enables a limited resource node to 
encode data using ABE (CP-ABE [63] and KP-ABE [73]), and it Save on a remote server. As 
explained in their papers, the power (exponential) for linear calculation increases with the 
number of traits. Their approach to computing the exponential a g includes the selection of n 
helpful tools and the division of a into n, part a, with the sum of all of them equal to a. 
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Then, each calibrator shows the ga i calculations, and the limited resource node can obtain the 
initial data with some multiple multiplications. 
 
Green and his colleagues proposed [74] a method for deciphering ABE in cloud storage 
applications. Its goal is to reduce the cost of decoding allowed users to request data stored in 
the cloud. In their proposed solution, they stated that the cloud user could be converted with a 
switch that allows the cloud to nearly decode the encrypted text to the same encrypted text 
without being able to read anything about the message. After that, the user can perform 
decryption using his secret key with cheaper operations. 
4.2.3 Unreliable Assistants 
Another aspect that can be created when developing outsourced security solutions is to be 
careful. In fact, even if the helper cannot learn something about the security of information, 
returning wrong results will result in false security operations. The term "unreliable donor" 
means that the donor may potentially have an error and result in inaccurate results. Therefore, 
in these cases, external security solutions require mechanisms to check the outcomes and 
identify failures. Below are some of the metrics that are presented to assistants (unofficial 
donors). 
In [75], the authors provide a protocol for modifying the adaptation license g a mod p using 
two unreliable assistants. In their solution, it is assumed that one of the contributors may deviate 
from the correct function, regardless of which one of them has this error. This is based on the 
breakdown of a and g into fragments that are randomly sent to each donor (to ensure 
confidentiality), and then they want to compute a set of (base profiles). The limited resource 
node can test donors by comparing some of the outputs that should provide the same result. 
In [76], authors propose the method of obtaining the calculation of elliptic curve pairs e (A, B) 
using a donor. The restricted node requests a series of hidden pairs of A and B, then examines 
the outputs by comparing the ones that should show the same result. However, this solution 
needs to perform multiple computing nodes. 
Ben Saideh et al., in their work [77], deal with asymmetric key designs (the key to 
transportation and the key to the agreement) for the Internet of Things. They use several donors 
and offer thresholds. In this method, the receiver can construct the main message (n is the 
number of contributors) to construct the original message if at least K receives a piece of n 
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message piece. In fact, in addition to protecting the threshold distribution against packet loss, 
it can also be used to check accuracy. By constructing and comparing different combinations 
of k packages from a set of n packets, one can identify a node that detects incorrect information. 
A suggestion for key transfer from Sayed and colleagues [77] considers protocols such as TLS 
and understands them. In the protocols, heavy sections of processing operations are asymmetric 
processing (encryption with the public key of the recipient and the signature of the message). 
The authors' solution is based on dividing the secret message into pieces and sending each one 
to a donor who performs asymmetric cryptography. The threshold distribution is based on a 
default error correction method [78] that adds redundancy to the packets so that if at least K 
packets are received, it can be retrieved. 
The second proposal [77] is the Diffie-Hellman-based Collaborative Key Protocol, such as the 
IKE and HIP. The more costly parts of the calculations are two modular (DH) and signature. 
To calculate the modular (modular) ga mod p, the authors suggest that a be divided into n parts 
a i, such as: 
p mod a=  i a  
Each aid receives an a i and calculates g 
a i mod p. The restricted node only applies n 
multiplications to obtain a modular one. 
 
The signature is also loaded into donor nodes. The threshold distribution is based on the 
Lagrange polynomial algorithm used in [79]. 
The principle of outsourcing some cryptographic operations to stronger assistants effectively 
helps reduce energy consumption. However, it may also raise security issues. The difference 
between the three approaches in the node type is helpful. Once trusted, each section can be sent 
to the donor without any security concerns to do that. The use of half-trust assistants entails the 
risk of confidentiality of the data; the transferred part should not lead to data disclosure. 
Similarly, when using donor nodes that may potentially be mistaken and return the wrong 
results, the outsourcing solution should examine the mechanism to validate the results. Table 
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Table 4: Outward Security Approach 
4.3 Compliance or security compatibility 
An adaptive approach involves setting or maintaining security measures in a variety of 
circumstances. This can be considered when internal or environmental parameters affecting the 
system (which are considered to be unclear after design time) and changes in runtime occur 
[80]. Since the Internet of Things is a very dynamic environment, adaptive security can be used 
to reduce energy consumption by implementing security measures. In fact, as it is unchanged, 
static security is always considered to be the worst thing that wastes network resources. 
As stated in [81], compatibility can be done in a parametric or structural way. Initially, 
adaptation is associated with changes that may occur in security measures and settings (such 
as the size of the key or the number of operational periods). In contrast, the structural method 
means changing the security method. For example, depending on the current state of the 
system, the security protocol can replace the other protocol. 
To enforce security, it is necessary to make a sufficient decision about the change in security 
measures. Otherwise, it can disrupt system security. For example, an adaptive approach, when 
energy is low, will reduce the level of security (to extend the life of the node). A malicious 
node can actually exploit this situation, and if the energy is low, it will have the advantage of 
attacking it. The statistics show that attackers can hack a small part of the system and even 
access more important parts [82]. We propose that adaptive security solutions be categorized 
according to considerations into decision making, to be divided into two categories: threat-
driven and data-driven. In fact, these two types of elements are in the security: the data that 




One way to ensure security is to assess threats. If there is no risk, no security measures are 
required and this will take unnecessary resources. The adaptive-security security approach 
focuses on assessing threats for the dynamic implementation of security, not systematically and 
in the worst case scenario. Some of the security-compatible security solutions are calculated 
below. 
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In [83], Lee and colleagues propose a trust-based model for implementing routing security in 
ad-hoc (MANET) mobile networks. Instead of requesting and verifying the certification at each 
routing stage, it avoids the suggestion that when a trusted node interacts with it. 
Chigan and colleagues in [84] propose a framework that is consistent with security in MANET 
security services. A unique module has been suggested to select a layer-to-layer interactive 
protocol with the desired security level. At runtime, the self-line modem module calculates the 
security of packet validity. In [85], Younis and colleagues propose proposing a trust-based 
compliance approach for security routing data in the WSN. Data between nodes can be 
encrypted at different levels, proportional to the trust path. The topic is determined by the less 
trusted node in the path. However, the assessment of trust in these solutions based on classical 
criteria such as fall rates and collision or collision with media access may not provide good 
reasons for changing the level of security (for example, increasing packet loss does not mean 
that The level of encryption will increase. In practice, trusted management systems are 
designed to be designed with selfish behaviors and internal attacks, not to help with 
cryptographic actions. In another solution, Helvey and his co-worker [86] put forward this issue 
and provide an adaptive security model based on trust for the Internet of Things. Instead, it 
systematically uses data authentication in every step or hop, but its solution allows the node to 
be validated only when it is necessary, depending on the trust level of the sender of the message. 
Here, the node's behavior is its capacity to send verified messages. However, as the authors 
have said, their solution requires recommendations on insecurity. 
Hamidi and Abi proposed a game-based Markov-based model for adaptive security in the 
Internet of Things, with emphasis on e-health programs. To model the mathematical 
framework, the dynamic context in which the objects work, includes threat and resource 
models. A set of strategies has been proposed for implementing security to deal with threats 
and resources. However, the authors do not define how a node determines if another has been 
compromised. They simulate an epidemic of spreading the virus in the WSNs, which makes 
them more analytical. The same theory can be proposed for work by Wang and his colleagues. 
4.3.2 Data-centered 
Another approach to compliance is to evaluate the sensitivity of the data. Data-focused 
approaches are emphasized on data rather than on the environment to assess threats. Exercising 
security measures on non-sensitive information consumes energy unnecessarily. The goal has 
 Energy Saving Mechanisms in the Security of the Internet of Things 





always been to adapt the security to the sensitivity of the data, not always consistent with its 
highest level. Some of the data-compatible adaptive approaches to data are presented below. 
In [89], authors propose a consistent security model for WSNs. Each application has its own 
security requirements. When the current energy limitations cannot meet the program's 
requirements, the degree of security gradually decreases. However, as stated by the authors, 
the decline in communications security will increase potential attacks for data transmitted over 
these periods of reduced security. 
Todo and his colleagues [90] propose a consistent security approach for the EH-WSN. Each 
packet is placed at a priority level, indicating the importance of the package and the security 
requirements that indicate the appropriate security package for that package. There are 
strategies to maximize the number of priority packets to ensure that the security needs of each 
package are guaranteed. Reducing security is only done when the energy limits of the system 
are not guaranteed. However, the authors note the fact that security reduces the potential for 
attacks. 
Contrary to the suggestion in [90], Moro and his colleagues in [91] suggest an alternative 
adaptation for EH-WSN. Their approach is based on the fact that the receiver starts with the 
idea that [92] at which the sender's node waits for the receiver's signature before sending the 
data. A receiver will match its own security of its energy and sends it to senders using a signal. 
This method allows the sender to select the appropriate receiver based on the packet sensitivity 
level. However, although this method allows a sender to choose based on the sensitivity of the 
appropriate packet receiver, it may be exploited by a malicious node. For example, if an 
unidentified node knows that the node has stopped its security measures, it can use this situation 
to inject unwanted packages (nodes) over the network through that node. 
The proposed approach in [93] introduces a customizable security module for wireless devices. 
The idea is that the level of security services can be based on the number of years that need to 
be protected. A plan that offers many years of suitable security parameters is suggested. 
However, it is assumed that the number of years in which information should be protected is 
known. 
The main difference between threatening and data-centric approaches is a security compliance 
approach. Emphasis on threat-based approaches to adaptation based on the assessment of 
environmental threats, and data-centric approaches emphasize data security. This is the main 
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factor in choosing between two methods. In cases where the program can provide data 
sensitivity specifications, we may consider a data-centered approach to compliance. Otherwise, 
we need to be able to assess threats to make enough changes in security. Table 5 provides a 
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Table 5: Appropriate security approach 
Both approaches involve different levels of service. However, note that a threat-centric 
approach to end-to-end security is more than a data-driven approach. In fact, a threat-centric 
solution for end-to-end points should also take into account the threat assessment in the 
communication path. In contrast, in almost non-threatened environments, data-centric 
approaches can easily result in low-security security. 
4.4 Implementation using low power security protocols 
Many of the old security protocols and algorithms are designed without regard to resource 
consumption. The emergence of computational computing increases the need for light security 
protocols to be processed. This is an efficient field for mathematicians. The goal is to provide 
efficient security protocols that require less energy. In fact, by implementing (or re-
implementing) security solutions based on low-power security protocols, power consumption 
can be reduced effectively. This section provides an overview of some of the well-known 
security protocols that are naturally low-end. This includes asymmetric encryption, symmetric 
encryption, as well as physical layer security protocols that are not based on encryption. 
4.4.1 Asymmetric protocols 
In public key cryptography, the key pair must be selected so that the private key can be created 
from the public key, equivalent to solving a difficult but solvable computational problem. For 
example, the RSA encryption security is based on the integer factoring difficulty (IFP). The 
security of the El-Gamal cryptography system and its types, such as DSS, is based on the 
severity of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Domain sizes, key parameters, and math 
operations are fundamental issues affecting the operations of the cryptographic system and 
security services [25]. 
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Other mathematical problems, whose failure can be the basis for public key cryptography, are 
proposed. In the following, some asymmetric encryption is provided that can be considered for 


















































Table 6: Low-power encryption solutions 
4.4.1.1 Robin's scheme 
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The Rabin scheme [94] is an old algorithm based on integer factorization (IFP). So its security 
is similar to RSA. The main feature of this algorithm is the computational asymmetry between 
encryption and decryption. The first stage of operations is much faster than its second stage, 
which is similar to the RSA using similar parameters. This will make Rabin's design attractive 
for resource-limited networks that need to be encrypted or verified. Proposals, as [95,96], refer 
to the Rabin scheme for implementing security solutions for Internet objects of objects using 
[95] a WSN program using nodes consisting of an Atmel 8mm microcontroller and a spartan -
IIE FPGA vs. inactive RFID tags [96]. 
4.4.1.2 ECC design 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a public key encryption method that can be used for 
cryptography and digital signatures [97]. This is based on the difficulty of calculating discrete 
logarithms in the elliptic points of an elliptic curve (this is ECDLP: an elliptic curve-discrete 
algorithm). The main operations of ECC are the scalar multiplication, which is very heavy in 
terms of processing. However, the same level of security provided by RSA can be measured 
by ECC using smaller sizes. This, in turn, affects the performance of basic math operations 
(faster computing). This also has a positive impact on the amount of data transferred and stored. 
Table 6 provides a comparison between the key parameters required by RSA and ECC for a 




Key size in RSA-
bit 
Key size in ECC-
bit 
80 1024 160 
112 2048 224 
128 3072 256 
192 8192 384 
256 15360 512 
Table 7: The size of keys 
Many works, such as [99,100], indicate that ECC is more suitable for smaller devices than 
RSA. The evaluation of Lead [99] includes two 8-bit processors (Chipcon CC1010 and Atmel 
ATmega128), while [100] also utilizes Atmel ATmega128. ECC ensures smaller key 
guarantees, faster calculations, as well as energy and bandwidth. In addition, several protocols 
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have been extracted from ECC, such as ECDSA, Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), ECDH, Encryption 
Integrated Curve Design (ECIES), etc. [98]. 
 
4.4.1.2 McEliece design 
 McEliece is a public key cryptography based on the ACT theory of encryption [101]. Its 
security is based on correcting error codes and arbitrary linear decoding problems. Encryption 
involves multiplying plain text with a matrix and then adding a random vector to it. The matrix 
represents a parameter that is generated by a linear code. The decoder can retrieve the message 
by considering the ciphertext as the code that receives an error. These operations take McEliece 
very fast. Research activities such as [102-104] show that McEliece is much faster than the 
classic encoders as RSA or El-Gamal. 
The main form of McEliece is the public key size (matrix). Compared to some cryptans like 
RSA, McEliece public keys are very expensive to store. In summary, they are presented in 
Table 7 of [105]. That's why McEliece has little attention to limited networks [25]. However, 
some solutions, [103,104], propose McEliece implementations for embedded devices, such as 
FPGAs (Xilinx families). Even if FPGAs are less restricted than other devices, they are part of 
the Internet of Things. 
4.4.1.3 NTRU scheme 
NTRU (TR polynomial ring) is a public key encryption used for encryption and digital 
signatures [106]. This method is based on the shortest vector (SVP) problem. NTRU operations 
are built on a polynomial ring, which makes it a very fast decoder compared to the RSA, El-
Gamal and ECC systems. Many of the assessments like [22, 107-109] show that the NTRU has 
lower power consumption on different devices, including FPGAs and microcontrollers. 
NTRU also requires less memory and less computing than other public key encryption. In fact, 
NTRU is faster than RSA and ECC. However, NTRU is reasonably priced compared to 
McEliece, but is also at worst expanding the message for encryption and signature [108]. This 
can affect the storage and communication capacity. 
Various low-power encryption systems provide lightweight security services for processing, 
based on them (confidentiality, digital signing, authentication, etc.). By using low power 
cryptography, saving heavy processing costs, energy saving can be done effectively. As shown 
in Table 8, each cipher has its own advantages (advantages and disadvantages). Selection of a 
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design can be done depending on the type of program. For example, the Rabin scheme can be 
effective for applications that require encryption and signature authentication. Objects with 
fairly modest memory can use McEliece's security services. From the guided work, ECC can 
be pointed out that ECC has the most use compared to other low-power encryption systems. 
Many solutions for resource-limited networks are based on ECC-based services (such as 
ECDSA, ECDH, etc.). This is most likely due to the cost-effective ECC in terms of computing 
and storage. Limited resource nodes are generally limited in energy and storage capacity. 
4.4.2 Symmetric protocols 
Although classical symmetric cryptography is lighter in terms of computing as compared to 
asymmetric cryptography (for example, AES using a 8-bit controller is 100 to 1,000 times 
faster than ECC), some of the recently developed symmetric protocols , Are more efficient. 
The emergence of very limited devices has led to the development of symmetrical 
cryptography. This includes two classes of symmetric protocols: block ciphers and stream 
ciphers. 
Most common protocols use block encryption. Stream cryptography can be easily created by 
block encryption, while some protocols cannot be designed with stream cryptography [25]. 
Due to their widespread use, many lightweight encryption blocks are suggested. Examples of 
these protocols are KATAN [111], KLEIN [112], mCrypton [113], Piccolo [114], PRESENT 
[115], TWINE [116] and EPCBC [117]. However, block encryption is generally designed to 
work on a platform (software or hardware). In 2013, the National Security Agency released its 
code blocks families SIMON and SPECK [118]. The purpose of these protocols is to provide 
security, lightweight and flexible. They earn a good performance in hardware and software 
environments. The evaluations presented in the explanatory document [118] use ASIC and 8-
bit microcontrollers. They show good results from the two protocols compared to many of the 
cited passwords in terms of ability, traceability, and so on. 
Lightweight ciphers have just received a lot of attention recently. Such protocols are more 
appropriate for applications in which the length of a plain text is unknown or continues, such 
as the flow of data in resource-limited networks. The eSTREAM project [119] was a major 
effort by the Network of Excellence Cryptology to carry out the compilation and compilation 
of the enclosed text. As a result of this project, a series of new data stream encryption protocols 
are presented. This protocol includes HC-128 [120], Rabbit [121], Salsa120 [122], 
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SOSEMANUK [123] - which are effective in running applications - Grain v1 [124], 
MICKEY2.0 [125] and Trivium [126] which are hardware protocols. Other protocols are 
discussed in [127]. 
4.4.3Physical layer security protocols 
Physical layer security is another branch of secure communication that acts on the physical 
layer, without encrypting data at higher levels. Based on the physical nature of the channel, 
such nodes as the physical channel crash (such as noise and fluctuations caused by the fading 
of the message during a collision) are used. In this approach, the sender encrypts the messages 
so that the receiver can capture the information, while it is possible to prevent the commentary 
being interpreted or manipulated by unauthorized persons [128]. Security approaches in the 
physical layer are less energy-consuming because they do not require heavy operations and 
processing as much as the classical encryption performed on higher layers. This makes physical 
security approaches suitable for resource-limited networks such as the Internet of Things [82 
and 129]. 
Two methods of research on the security of the physical layer have been made: encryption 
(encoding) in the transmission and secret key key agreement (series). The encoding in the 
transfer can be done without the need for a secret or confidential key. The first work on sending 
a message was done by Wiener [130], where loopholes in a channel using a wire display a copy 
of a message sent to the destination node. It has also been extended to non-decomposable 
channels [131]. Recently, many efforts have been made to eradicate wireless waves, the 
existence of several antennas and channels with several users. For example, the effect of fading 
on confidentiality has been studied in [132,133], the degree of confidentiality in multiple 
antennas has been investigated in [134,135], while channels with multiple access in [136, 137] 
has been investigated. Other studies on coding in transmission have been investigated [138]. 
Physical layer security approaches can also be used to provide an agreement key in existing 
cryptographic systems. The idea of this method is to use a shared key that connects the nodes 
to the use of a secret key, as there is a potential for eavesdropping. It is possible that two nodes 
agree on a secret key on public channels, in [139] this mechanism is shown. The author suggests 
that even noisy communications can be used to create coupled sequences in two nodes, 
enabling them to agree on a secret key. A related work close to this method is presented in 
[140]. Recently, many clandestine secret methods operate on the basis of cross-channel 
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wireless metrics as a source of random conditions. Such approaches include key generation 
based on the use of multi-band channel parameters [141], channels where wireless fading 
occurs [142], the content of Gaussian multi-dimensional wireless channel information [143], 
etc.  
4.5 Compression of Size 
As a security service in relation to data, the runtime is proportional to the size of the data. Most 
data are large and take longer to run. Energy consumption is directly related to this parameter. 
Size compressions techniques help reduce consumption by reducing the size of data. This can 
be related to the protocol header or data to be processed in the encryption algorithm. 
 
4.5.1 Header compression 
Security protocols are also important for solving communication issues, as well as secure, 
packet headers. The header size directly affects energy consumption, as it is transmitted by a 
limited resource node. 
Reza [144] and his colleagues refer to the use of IPsec to protect data in 6LoWPAN sensor 
networks. When IPsec is considered, IPv6 sub-headers must be included in any data processing. 
Authors' suggestions provide 6LoWPAN specification that allows encryption and compression 
of IPsec headers. Compression in the 6LoWPAN layer is generally based on the deletion of 
fields that are implicitly known to all nodes or can be obtained from other layers. This solution 
allows the packet size to be appropriate for an 802.15.4 frame and thus reduces energy 
consumption when sending packets due to a small closed package. The header compression 
can also reduce the number of steps for authentication (when the original message is 
authenticated, the physical address or MAC is also added to the packet). For example, at least 
the IPsec header uses 24-byte HMAC-SHA1-96, which can be 16 bytes after optimizing 
compression. 
In another work, Raza et al. [145, 146] suggest a compression solution for waste reduction. 
Authors refer to the DTLS protocol to protect CoAP in networks that support 802.15.4. Their 
solution provides specifications for compressing the DTLS header in the 6LoWPAN layer. The 
evaluation shows that DTLS header compression reduces energy consumption, especially if 
the use of DTLS involves the partitioning of uncompressed headers. 
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In [147], Lifoth and colleagues show that decreasing header size can reduce energy 
consumption. Their proposed security protocol at the link layer for WSNs does this 
compression by removing the cache field from the header and replacing it with a feedback feed 
that is simultaneously on each side. 
4.5.2 Compression of encrypted text  
In addition, some of the effects focus on reducing processing, and consequently reducing the 
size of encrypted text, mainly for ABE protocols. In [148], Cheng and colleagues provide a 
method for reducing consumption in the CP-ABE protocol by compressing its features. In fact, 
the overhead of this protocol happens by adding some attributes that are expressed by users. 
This proposal will reduce the size by combining a number of expressed attributes with the 
gateways AND (att1 AND att2 AND att3) into a unit called the "community of attributes". This 
is done using the correct first number. Any integer greater than 1 can be expressed as a product 
of the first divisor in a unique way. Thus, the mapping of each of the attributes is mapped to a 
number of first numbers, and the mapping of the traits is represented as the product of the first 
numbers. 
In [149], Chen and his colleagues faced the same problem and proposed a solution to the CP-
ABE. Their solution was to build the AND gateways and to combine attributes. This means 
that the user-defined properties with the AND gate are aggregated into an attribute. 
Other solutions that provide ABE protocols for compressing encrypted text, regardless of its 
size policies, are presented in [150-152]. 
4.6 Hybridization 
Ultimately, hybridization can be used to combine and utilize various solutions. This issue is 
about energy saving mechanisms or security protocols. Some of these are listed below. 
4.6.1 A combination of mechanisms 
Based on the mechanisms mentioned above, they can be combined to reduce consumption. 
Each of them refers to a particular way to reduce energy consumption. A combination of 
mechanisms can be considered for solutions in different fields. For example, in [58], authors 
have explained the possibility of combining their solution (on-line / off-line security in ABE) 
with what is described in [74] (Outdoor Security in ABE). In fact, the authors' suggestions 
make it easier to perform encryption with pre-computation. But they do not take a method for 
decoding operations. On the other hand, the solution in [74] assumes that the encrypted ABE 
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text may be stored in the cloud and offers an outsourcing method for users to request 
decryption. A combination of these solutions reduces consumption for encryption and 
decryption in ABE. 
In [153], the authors examine compression of headers and outsourced security to reduce energy 
consumption in the HIP. This indicates that the hedge in the resource-limited nodes, in addition 
to the fact that heavier computing is performed for each initiator and respondent. The proposed 
solution takes into account the two mechanisms of optimization and energy saving. 
4.6.2 A combination of protocols 
Energy consumption can be reduced by combining protocols. Some protocols save energy, but 
they cannot match things with the Internet. Other protocols are not compatible with the objects 
of the Internet, except in terms of energy. Hybrid solutions will be beneficial for protocols to 
gain more benefits. 
In [154], Wicks and colleagues propose a hybrid deployment framework for WSNs. In this 
solution, the constrained nodes use symmetric cryptography for power, and only gates that use 
more energy use public key cryptography. This is done by allowing the gateways to verify the 
finite nodes. This method uses relatively cheap encryption, and when it accesses a gateway, it 
uses public key cryptography that is heavier in terms of processing, and sometimes even digital 
signing is possible.  
In the framework of AGREE, proposed by Bainchi et al. [62], we mention a solution that allows 
to reduce CP-ABE costs by combining it with a symmetric protocol such as AES. This method 
is based on data encryption with symmetric protocol and symmetric key encryption used with 
CP-ABE. This method is very useful because the symmetric key size is generally smaller than 
the data size. Additionally, for encryption with the same policy, CP-ABE is performed only 
once (to encrypt the symmetric key used). 
5. MORE DISCUSSION 
The proposed classification in this paper shows that there are several ways to reduce energy 
consumption in security protocols. Many security services are involved in various situations. 
This section provides an analysis of the considerations and parameters that will affect the use 
of the energy-saving mechanism. 
The application of the energy saving mechanism depends on specific factors. More precisely, 
two parameters that can affect the application of mechanisms are identified: the deployment 
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environment in which the energy-saving mechanism is used and the target protocol. Below, 
efficient energy mechanisms are discussed with respect to these parameters. Discussions focus 
on the causes of consumption (heavy operations, data size, and number of calls) identified in 
Section 3.5. Table 11 summarizes this discussion. 
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Table 8: Application of Saving Mechanisms 
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Online / offline security reduce energy consumption by spending part of the overall security 
plan. As based on the use of the pre-calculation technique, the use of this technique does not 
really depend on the deployment environment. However, some programs can offer more 
benefits, since the storage space for the Internet nodes of objects is limited. An online incentive 
program for online / offline is mobile technology. A mobile object can perform offline 
calculations and store results when connected to an electrical power supply. When the device 
is separate, calculations are applied on-line using stored results. The same observations can be 
observed for energy technology. Restricted resources can use energy in periods where external 
energy is available for pre-calculation, and then use the results. Several developed solutions, 
for example, [44, 58, and 62] refer to these types of programs (see Table 3). You can always 
apply this mechanism to other networks using offline phase before deployment. 
Online / Outside Security requires several pre-computational operations. The solutions 
presented in this article provide specifications for the construction of two stages. As outlined 
in Section 4.1, service-centric approaches are public and are not connected to a data protocol. 
In contrast, operations-focused solutions focus more on how precompiled heavy operations are, 
and are only suitable for protocols that can be exploited based on specific operations. For 
example, [44] aims to target encoder-based protocols [43], which defines algorithms based on 
the base modular syntax [58] for the ABE protocol. This will depend on online security / off-
line (offline) security targeting. 
Online / offline security are a heavy energy consumer (with some heavy operations pre-
processing and maintenance). This makes the technique not dependent on the particular 
security service, but it can be used in any protocol that computes computable parts. However, 
using this mechanism for cryptographic schemes is generally more difficult than signing. In 
fact, depending on the type of entity being considered, a message is encrypted. Therefore, the 
receiver is not known, in addition to the fact that the encryption message is not known until the 
on-line online phase is known. This does not apply to signatures because the node signs all 
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Encrypts the public key 
using the public key 
Check + 
According to the 
signatory, the review is 
done 
Decrypt - 
Decrypt with your private 
key 
Table 9: The dependence of asymmetric schemes in the key 
 
The online / offline concept was introduced in the 1990s, but its first application for key 
public cryptography in 2008 (as claimed by authors in [5]). 
Online security / offline security for encryption schemes is still possible. Many of the solutions, 
such as [51-55], are based on a factor correction scheme that uses algebraic relationships to 
make cryptographic methods consistent with their own view. However, it generally has 
decoding heavy duty (factor correction by decoding). In addition, the problem of key 
dependency on encryption schemes can be less restrictive than the time it is known, as 
suggested in the proposed solution in [62]. 
Outsourced security is based on heavy-duty operations to more powerful devices. Its use 
mainly depends on the deployment environment, because it requires the availability of helpful 
tools that should be used for resource-limited nodes. Some solutions, like [77,155], use 
heterogeneous objects on the Internet to transfer heavy operations to other powerful devices. 
Other works like [72.74] use the cloud for outsourcing. While other solutions like [36, 64] are 
based on access to TPM modules. Note that due to the fact that this mechanism uses nodes or 
other devices, particular attention should be given to what should be granted and to the type of 
helping devices (trust, semi-trust or unreliable). This does not help to focus on the security of 
the nodes, but it takes into account the security of the resource-limited nodes. 
As with online / offline applications, outsourced security uses heavier operations as energy 
consumers (by giving it to the donor) and is not related to a specific service. For example, [36] 
RSA and XTEA are using trusted assistant [71] CP-ABE with semi-trust assistants [75] 
interested in power or display protocols using Irregular devices. This makes an outsourcing 
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solution dependent on the target protocol (the target protocol should be based on the operations 
determined by the outsourcing solution). 
Of the work done, the security of the outsourced and online security / offline security-related 
communications can be outlined. In fact, both are based on dividing the encryption scheme into 
two parts and implementing only one part of it by itself. The other part is passed as an assistant 
to the device for external security or before it is calculated for online / offline security. In this 
way, an external process can be converted to an online / offline section, and already computes 
the portion to be allocated to it. However, this part should be pre-calculated so that it can be 
calculated in the offline phase of the line. One of the applications that can be used to transfer 
from external sources to online / offline security is mobile or mobile environments. A limited 
node can lose your device assistant (due to mobility). Therefore, before losing contact with 
auxiliary devices, a limited node can run offline phase to reduce future consumption. 
An online / offline scheme can also be transferred to one of the external sources, and this section 
has passed the pre-calculation to it. However, as outsourcing techniques with the help of other 
donor organs, particular attention is paid to the type of donor (trusted, semi-trusted or 
unreliable) and what needs to be done in order to fail in security. Take up It can also be 
considered in mobile environments where a node that has online security / off-line (offline) 
access can access the device assistant. For this purpose, it can be transformed into outsourcing 
and transferring the pre-calculation part to these devices. Table 10 summarizes the linkages 
and criteria between these two mechanisms. 


























Table 10: Relationship between online / offline security and its outsourcing 
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Security compatibility (security compliance) is based on security settings based on the field of 
work. This method is related to applications that may occur in environments where data 
sensitivity is high on security issues or in an environment where the level of security threats 
that the security service needs to create against them. In fact, the use of adaptive security is 
directly related to the deployment environment. This requires the availability of information at 
run-time, against threats or data sensitivity, so that it sets the security level without 
compromising security. For example, solutions [83-86] are based on the possibility of assessing 
nodes' confidence around security enforcement and [89-91] for information intelligence 
information programs. 
On the other hand, adaptive security solutions do not need to know the purpose of the security 
protocol and its operations to comply. As mentioned in Section 4.3, this information can be 
done either parametric or structural. Using security-compatibility solutions is not dependent on 
a particular class of security protocols. 
Adaptive security allows you to systematically save the worst case by adopting security 
measures. This can be done by making changes (parametric or structural) in security protocols 
or by simply calling the protocol only when necessary. For example, in [90], compatibility can 
be done by changing the encryption key while in compliance with [87] it is done by applying 
or not authenticating the service. Therefore, adaptive security can be reduced by targeting 
heavy processing operations or the number of calls. 
Low-power security protocols are an alternative solution for heavy classical cryptography in 
terms of processing. It provides a base for building energy efficient security services. 
Therefore, with a specific security solution, energy can be reduced by replacing the heavy 
protocol with a low power and low power protocol. This requires access to a low-power 
equivalent protocol. For example, in a solution that needs a negotiated key; ECDH can be used 
instead of DH. However, a security protocol may not have the same implementation in some 
low-security security classes. For example, McEliece's encryption system [101] does not allow 
message signatures (although solutions are later proposed as [156]). Paying attention to low-
security security depends on the target protocol. 
Low security protocols provide efficient services based on operations that are less heavily 
processed. This will increase the use of low-power security protocols. For example, the main 
function of ECC [97] is numerical multiplication using smaller parameters (compared to RSA). 
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NTRU operations [106] are built on a polynomial ring, which is much faster compared to 
cryptographic systems such as RSA and El-Gamal, which are based on modular modularity. 
Physical security protocols do not rely on heavy operations that are present in classical apps. 
Execution time and energy consumption are also as important as data, compression techniques 
and data size reduction is still important while retaining the features of the protocol. The header 
compression techniques in the security protocols, which consider aspects of communication, 
determine its importance. These protocols are IPsec, TLS, or DTLS, for example. In addition, 
other data compression solutions have been reported to reduce processing. These two 
categories of size compression method are directly related to the destination protocol. The 
header compression solution, in certain fields, is designed, as in [144-146], for specific 
protocols, some of which header fields can be compressed (for example, they can be uncovered 
from other headers). The same observations can be made for solutions that reduce data 
processing. 
Obviously, this technique achieves better energy efficiency by considering the size of the data 
as a reason for consumption. Solutions, for example, in [144-146] reduce consumption simply 
by reducing header size, because they are transmitted by resource-limited nodes. In addition, 
solutions such as [148,149] heavy operations continue to be maintained. However, processing 
for some large data is reduced by the size expressed by users. 
It turns out that many of the efficient mechanisms of energy are independent of the target 
platform. For example, outsourced security anticipates costly operations due to heavy 
processing operations to other donors, to help nodes reduce consumption, online security, and 
off-line (offline). Adaptive security is based on dynamic changes at the security level, while 
compression of size, aims to reduce the size of the data. These mechanisms are not related to a 
particular platform, and they can work with various Internet-based objects. In addition, low-
security security protocols are designed for resource-limited nodes. Performance evaluations 
related to these protocols are mainly done by looking at resource constraints. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The Internet of Things (IoT) has expanded widely in many areas (healthcare, smart grids, 
transportation, production systems, etc.). Sensitivity related to the subject, attention to the 
security services on the Internet requires objects. Devices connected to the Internet are objects 
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that are limited to resources and designed to work for a long time. However, many security 
measures usually have high energy consumption. 
This paper examines mechanisms for energy efficiency in the field of Internet security of 
objects. Earlier studies are more concerned with studying Internet security solutions that are 
economically efficient. This article is a step further and addresses the mechanisms that will 
enable the development of energy security solutions. The classification of energy storage 
techniques is suggested in the Internet security of objects. Each method has been studied, as 
well as the related work that it uses. This research shows that any energy saving approach 
involves changes to the main security protocol, and some new issues may occur. 
That is why discussions are under way on the use of energy saving techniques. Discussions 
have focused on the application of mechanisms and parameters affecting their use, which is 
still widely used. From this study, it can be concluded that various solutions can be considered 
to reduce energy consumption in security services. This research also increases the need for 
comparable assessments in terms of stored energy between different methods and mechanisms. 
In fact, an effective evaluation should consider comparable environments, such as target 
operating systems (such as microprocessors, FPGAs, ASICs), similar target protocols, and so 
on. This can be presented as a new perspective. We believe that such a view may be accepted 
in the scientific and industrial communities and can help designers of the security protocol to 
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